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Abstract—CyberCIEGE is a sophisticated network security 
simulation packaged as a video game and used by educators 
around the world to enhance information assurance education 
and training at universities, community colleges, within the DoD, 
and in other government agencies.  The CyberCIEGE game 
engine was recently expanded to include Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) features including certification authorities, 
selection of installed roots and cross certification.  CyberCIEGE 
Virtual Private Network (VPN) gateways, VPN clients and email 
clients were then extended to incorporate the new PKI features. 
CyberCIEGE PKI abstractions are described in terms of player 
configuration choices and the consequences of these choices on 
network management and vulnerabilities.  The CyberCIEGE 
game engine modifications include modeling of chains of trust 
and risks of cross certification schemes. The benefits of these 
enhancements include coherent integration of identity 
management technologies, ranging from the human interface 
through to the supporting distributed infrastructure, into 
scenarios. Benefits also include support for recent new scenarios 
focused on the PKI infrastructure, identity management, or both; 
and the ability to tie both identity management and PKI to 
concepts of identification, authentication, provenance, and access 
control. 
 
Keywords-network cyber security; identity management; 
information assurance; educational video game 
I. INTRODUCTION 
CyberCIEGE is a video game that is used to enhance 
computer network security education and training through 
constructive resource management techniques such as those 
employed in the Tycoon© games [1][2]. In the CyberCIEGE 
world, players spend virtual money to build, operate and 
defend networks, and can watch the consequences of their 
choices, while under attack.   
The extensible nature of CyberCIEGE allows its developers 
and the larger CyberCIEGE community to serve a wide range 
of teaching objectives and desired participant experiences. At 
the simple end of the spectrum, scenarios can be constructed to 
make students aware of the importance of strong passwords 
and the dangers of email attachments [3]. More complex 
scenarios teach students how to configure systems and 
networks, for example how to set up router filtering to support 
various policy objectives. 
In the CyberCIEGE interactive environment, players1 are 
guided through a series of scenarios that highlight various 
cyber security education and training objectives. These include 
such topics as user passwords, e-mail attachments, antivirus 
and identity theft.   More advanced scenarios cover significant 
aspects of network management and defense including the use 
of link encryptors, network filters, VPNs, access control 
mechanisms, and identity devices such as card readers and 
biometric scanners. Players make tradeoffs and prioritization 
decisions as they are challenged to maintain a balance between 
budget, productivity, and security. Players must keep the 
virtual world’s personnel happy (e.g., by providing Internet 
access), while protecting assets from vandals and professional 
attacks. 
CyberCIEGE is used by a range of DoD and other 
government agencies to enhance information assurance 
education, training and awareness.  It is also used in dozens of 
universities and community colleges.  CyberCIEGE was 
created by the Center for Information Systems Security Studies 
and Research (CISR) at NPS, and Rivermind, Inc., of San 
Mateo, California.  CyberCIEGE is available at no cost to 
agencies of the US Government. 
Our paper begins with an overview of CyberCIEGE’s 
components. Then we describe the CyberCIEGE network 
simulation, and that is followed by a discussion of game engine 
extensions made to represent identity management, PKI 
functions and PKI-enabled applications. These extensions are 
designed to help students understand issues related to the 
management of the identity of users and the identity of data.  
This work included configurable VPNs, email encryption and 
authentication, and support for simulated PKI functions within 
the game. 
 
II. BASIC CYBERCIEGE COMPONENTS 
CyberCIEGE consists of several elements: a domain-
specific simulation engine and scenario definition language; a 
                                                           
1 We use the word “player” to refer to students who interact with the game 
simulation.  Here, the term “student” is used rather broadly, and can include: 
traditional students in K-12, colleges, and universities; employees requiring 
awareness regarding cyber security issues; technicians who require specific 
training, etc. We use the word “user” to refer to the virtual characters within 
the game. 
These CyberCIEGE extensions were sponsored by the Biometrics Task Force. 
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scenario development tool, and a video-enhanced 
encyclopedia. [3] 
The game is extensible in that new CyberCIEGE scenarios 
tailored to specific audiences and topics are easily created. The 
scenario definition language expresses security-related risk 
management trade-offs to be developed for different scenarios. 
The CyberCIEGE simulation engine interprets each scenario as 
written in the scenario definition language and presents the 
player with the resulting simulation. Specific player 
experiences and the consequences of the player choices are a 
function of the particular scenario.  
The game engine and the language that feeds it are rich in 
cyber security concepts; it is possible to simulate sophisticated 
environments subject to a variety of threats and vulnerabilities. 
Substantial support is also provided for relatively brief, scripted 
training and awareness scenarios, and includes cartoon-like 
balloon speech by the virtual users, message tickers, multiple 
choice questions that direct game play, pop-up quizzes and 
conditional play of video sequences.  
Instructors may assess students through logs produced as a 
result of player activity. Triggers within the scenario cause 
output to be appended to each log, where a variety of status 
indicators may be recorded. A separate log is maintained for 
each player, thus allowing the instructor to track the progress of 
individual students.  
III. OVERVIEW OF THE NETWORK SECURITY SIMULATION  
The CyberCIEGE game engine assesses the virtual users’ 
ability to achieve their goals [4].  These goals are defined in 
terms of read and write accesses to assets.   Similarly, the game 
engine assesses the virtual attackers’ ability to read and write 
assets when driven by motives the scenario designer associates 
with those assets.  Both of these functions rely on a simulation 
of the network topology created by the player within 
constraints imposed by the scenario designer using the Scenario 
Development Tool [5]. 
A. User and Attacker Access to Information Assets 
The game engine manages the network topology as a 
collection of computers and network devices interconnected via 
one or more networks.  The simulation represent information as 
“assets”, which exist on computers.  Virtual users and attackers 
access assets either directly by interacting with the computer 
that contains the asset, or indirectly via one or more network 
connections.  Additionally, attackers can compromise assets via 
direct access to networks (i.e., via a wire tap).  And attackers 
might attempt to bribe authorized users to disclose or modify 
assets.   
Players interconnect CyberCIEGE networks using routers, 
VPN gateways and link encryptors.  Workstations and servers 
may be connected to multiple networks.   Components include 
simulated operating system functions that provide access 
control mechanisms, supporting policies (e.g., authentication 
and identification) and application policies such as a router 
filtering of network connections.  The game abstracts away 
hubs and network switches such that a single named network 
can connect many computers and network devices.   
Direct access to computers and networks is constrained by 
simulated physical security mechanisms (e.g., walls, guards, 
and locks.)  Logical access to computers is constrained by 
authentication and identification mechanisms including 
authentication servers, card readers, biometric scanners, and 
password policies.  Once logical access to a computer is 
achieved, logical access to assets is further constrained by 
operating system-based access control mechanisms (e.g., an 
ACL). 
The simulation assesses network topology, logical access 
controls and physical access controls to evaluate whether 
virtual users can achieve their goals to access assets and 
whether attackers can compromise the assets. 
B. Simulation Fidelity 
The fidelity of the simulation is designed to be high enough 
for players to make meaningful choices with respect to 
deploying network security countermeasures, but not so high as 
to overwhelm the player with administrative minutia. The 
purpose of the game is not to train players to deploy and 
configure specific network products.  Rather, CyberCIEGE is 
intended to illustrate abstract functions of technical protection 
mechanisms and configuration-related vulnerabilities. For 
example, an attack might occur because a particular firewall 
port is left open and a specific software service is not patched.  
The game does not include abstractions to represent network 
addressing (and thus not Network Address Translation) and it 
is not intended to illustrate denial of service attacks other than 
relatively abstract attacks that take place against individual 
components. 
Instead of identifying problems with real-world networks 
and training network operations personnel to recognize and 
respond to specific network attacks, a driving philosophy 
behind CyberCIEGE is that when the most serious network 
attacks occur, there is often little or nothing to see.  Somehow 
your competitor gets your secrets.  Or your enemy adds 
features to your logistics management system.  (Clearly, if an 
organization discovers that it has been successfully attacked, a 
postmortem analysis can sometimes reveal useful information 
about the attack.) 
C. Assessing User Goals 
When a virtual user attempts to achieve a goal, the game 
engine assesses the network topology and determines if the 
user has physical and logical access to a source workstation 
such that one of the following is true: 
• The asset is on the source workstation 
• The asset is on a computer on a network shared with 
the source workstation 
• The asset is on a computer on a network reachable 
from a network containing the source workstation via 
one or more network devices (e.g., routers) 
The network topology processing uses a brute force 
enumeration of paths that might lead from the source 
workstation to the computer that contains the asset.  With the 
exception of email services, computers do not act as gateways 
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to other connected networks when processing user goals.  
Given a suitable path between the source workstation and the 
asset required to achieve a user goal, the game engine 
associates the asset with each network segment that the asset 
would traverse for use in subsequent wiretap attack processing. 
D. Assessing Attacker Access to Assets 
When virtual attackers attempt to compromise assets, the 
attack engine employs a similar assessment of the network 
topology and the access control mechanisms.  However, the 
attacker can use computers as gateways to other networks, and 
attackers may also supply their own computer and connect it 
directly to accessible networks, including the simulated 
Internet.  This computer can then indirectly access the 
computer containing the targeted asset, or the computer can 
wiretap the network and collect or alter assets that transit the 
network as the result of some user achieving a goal as 
described above.   Attackers may also employ malicious 
software, e.g., a Trojan horse that alters the asset (in the case of 
integrity-driven motives), or sends the contents of the asset to a 
network accessible by the attacker. 
Malicious software appears on computers and network 
devices in a variety of ways, including poor configuration 
management and virtual users who compulsively open email 
attachments.  Within the simulation, malicious software also 
arrives via unpatched network services (e.g., web servers)  and 
whose services are not blocked by network filters. 
E. Network Filters 
As noted above, goals are defined in terms of reading or 
writing assets.  Goals may also be defined in terms of the types 
of software required to achieve the goal.  For example, a goal 
requiring read-write access to an email asset might also require 
an email transport application.  The scenario designer may 
designate the goal software as filtered, which may further 
constrain user (or attacker) access to assets via networks due to 
network filter settings.  For example, a router’s network filter 
might be configured to block email transport application traffic.  
This would prevent a virtual user from achieving an email goal 
via that router, and it would prevent a moderately motivated 
attack from exploiting flaws in the email transport application. 
F. Assurance of Mechanism vs Attacker Motive 
When determining the success of attacks, attacker motive is 
compared against the strength of the simulated logical and 
physical mechanisms that potentially protect the asset from 
compromise.  For example, a network filter will not prevent an 
attack if it is hosted on a router whose operating system is 
weaker than the attacker’s motive.  Within the simulation, the 
strength of protection mechanisms is represented as an 
“assurance” value that the scenario designer associates with 
individual operating systems and applications.  To protect 
assets, the protection mechanisms must also be properly 
configured (e.g., if an asset’s ACL permits “public” access, it 
may be vulnerable regardless of the strength of the operating 
system.) 
G. Link Encryptors Protect Network Communication 
Simulated link encryptors come in two forms: those that 
represent manually loaded keys and those that represent 
software-based key distribution.  Players configure these 
devices by selecting which network connections are encrypted 
and which are not. Manually loaded key systems require the 
player to select the same key on both devices, and the engine 
tracks key life such that scenario designers can simulate stale 
keys, e.g., by triggering player feedback and penalties if the 
key life exceeds a designer-specified value.   Software-based 
key management systems don’t experience stale keys, but their 
assurance is limited by the assurance of the operating system 
within the platform.  With suitable attacker motive, software-
based link encryptors are vulnerable to two kinds of simulated 
attacks: 
• Wiretapping in which the data is transmitted in a key 
known by the attacker; 
• Indirect network attacks in which the attacker uses a 
subverted link encryptor as a gateway along the path 
toward the computer hosting the targeted asset. 
H. Original CyberCIEGE VPN Gateways 
Initially, CyberCIEGE was designed so that VPN gateways 
only protected Internet traffic, and they supported a single local 
network connection.  Players could not otherwise configure 
VPN gateways and there were no VPN clients.  Traffic 
between two VPN gateways was assumed to be encrypted and 
authenticated.  VPN gateways were vulnerable to the two 
attacks just described for software-based link encryptors. 
IV. EXTENDED VPN FEATURES 
In support of a comprehensive identity management 
education program, [6] CyberCIEGE has been extended to 
better simulate identity management of data.  As part of this 
work, CyberCIEGE VPN gateways were re-implemented so 
that they could offer protection over any network, not just the 
Internet.  VPN gateways now also support multiple LAN 
connections, and CyberCIEGE workstations can be configured 
to use VPN client mechanisms.  Players may configure VPN 
mechanisms to selectively protect traffic depending on its 
source and destination, simulating the management of IPSEC 
security associations [7].   For example, the player can 
configure a gateway to encrypt and authenticate all traffic 
between a local LAN and a remote business partner.  Similarly, 
the same VPN gateway can be configured to permit 
unprotected traffic between that same local LAN and the 
remainder of the Internet. 
A. VPN Connection Profiles 
The game refers to these VPN configurations as 
“connection profiles”.   For example, consider the topology 
represented in Fig. 1.  Table 1 illustrates a connection profile 
within the “Local VPN Gateway” of Fig. 1, the first entry of 
which results in encryption and authentication all data between 
Joe’s computer and the Branch Server. 
Connection profiles may include wildcard values to indicate 
any matching item.  The second entry in Table 1 matches all 
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traffic.  Connection profiles are an ordered list, and the game 
selects the first entry that matches the source and destination of 
the traffic. Thus, the second entry in Table 1 would cause the 
local VPN gateway to permit unprotected traffic between Joe’s 
workstation and other destinations on the Internet. 
VPN mechanisms occur in pairs (i.e., two gateways or a 
gateway and a VPN client).  The remote VPN gateway in Fig. 
1 must have a connection profile that encrypts and 
authenticates traffic between Joe’s workstation and the branch 
server.  Otherwise, the two gateways could not exchange 
traffic. 
B. Educational Purpose of Connection Profiles 
When players configure connection profiles, they make 
decisions regarding the identity management of data.  For 
example, by selecting “authentication” as the protection for 
data exchanged via a remote VPN gateway, the player 
establishes the identity of the source of the data.  Connection 
profiles also educate players regarding the limitations of such 
mechanisms.  Consider an example in which a valuable secret 
asset resides on the branch server in the example topology 
represented in Fig. 1.  The connection profile within the local 
VPN gateway (per Table 1) ensures that when Joe accesses the 
remote secret, the traffic is encrypted and authenticated.  And 
the remote VPN gateway may be configured to ensure that 
such communication only occurs with the specifically 
identified VPN gateway, (i.e., the one at Joe’s site).  Note 
however that by letting Joe access the rest of the Internet via 
unprotected traffic, the local VPN gateway permits a Trojan 
horse within Joe’s computer to send a copy of the secret asset 
to an attacker on the Internet. 
CyberCIEGE scenarios lead the player to potentially 
configure such vulnerable systems by giving the users, e.g., 
Joe, goals to access the remote secret asset as well as surfing 
the web.  Low motive attacks may be countered by ensuring 
Joe’s computer is free of malicious software via good 
configuration management, antivirus, network filters and 
procedural policies.  Later in the scenario, a higher motive asset 
is introduced, and the likelihood that this higher motive results 
in malicious software cannot be countered with mere “good 
practices.”  In such a case, the easiest solution for the player is 
to buy Joe a second workstation and connect a second LAN via 
which to surf the Internet while reserving the other workstation 
and LAN for accessing the high value secrets. 
C. Handling VPN’s within Network Routes 
As the game engine performs its enumeration of possible 
routes between users (or attackers) and assets, it keeps track of 
open VPN tunnels such that every route segment can be 
queried with respect to open VPN tunnels (including 
potentially nested VPN mechanisms).  If a route terminates at 
an attacker’s computer with open VPN tunnels, the assurance 
values of the remote VPN mechanisms are compared with the 
attacker’s motive to compromise the asset. If the route 
terminates with no open VPN tunnels, then the presence of 
VPN mechanisms does not hinder access to the asset. 
When goals are achieved and the presence of assets on 
network segments is recorded, the game engine also records 
properties of VPN tunnels that are open when the asset hits the 
network segment.  Subsequently, during processing of wiretap 
attacks, the assurance of the VPN mechanisms that open the 
tunnels and those that close the tunnels are compared against 
the attacker motives to compromise the assets.  
D. Identity of a Platform 
Instead of deploying pairs of VPN gateways, the player 
may choose to configure VPN clients within workstations to 
communicate with a remote VPN gateway.  One game scenario 
forces the player toward this solution by not providing enough 
funds to purchase two VPN gateways.  The VPN clients are 
configured very much like the VPN gateways. 
With respect to information assurance, one of the most 
significant distinctions between a VPN gateway and a VPN 
client is that the former is often more easily locked down into a 
strictly managed configuration.  On the other hand, VPN 
clients exist within workstations whose configurations change 
TABLE I.  LOCAL VPN GATEWAY CONNECTION PROFILE 
Local Network  Local Host  Remote Network Domain Remote Host Protection 
LAN 1 Joe’s Computer Our Branch Office Branch Server Encryption & Authentication 
* * * * None 
 
 
Figure 1.   Example VPN Topology 
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frequently, e.g., through installation of new programs or device 
drivers.  Recently, commodity computing platforms have 
included a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) that can attest to 
the identity of the platform, including software loaded on the 
platform [8].  A TPM can be used to manage the keys for a 
VPN client such that the keys are not unlocked unless the 
platform has an expected software configuration and an 
authenticated user.  Loading unauthorized drivers on such a 
platform would prevent the keys from being used, and thus 
might prevent the VPN mechanism itself from being subverted. 
CyberCIEGE VPN clients can be configured to require a 
“measured boot” to ensure the platform boots into a known 
state.  The simulated workstation must then also be configured 
to measure its boot process and attest to the identity of the 
platform.  If the player makes these security-enhancing 
selections, then attackers must have a commensurately higher 
motive in order to subvert the simulated VPN client 
mechanisms. 
E. Key Management 
When configuring VPN mechanisms, players can choose 
between the use of symmetric secret keys and PKI.  When the 
player selects the former, costs are incurred to simulate the 
challenge of physically distributing secret keys, with the 
highest costs occurring when shared secrets must be established 
with a remote business partner.  Selection of secret keys may 
also leave a system vulnerable to rouge VPN mechanisms 
within the enterprise.  A scenario designer might define a VPN 
gateway that happens to use the default shared secret key, but 
cannot be managed by the player.  Unless the player explicitly 
changes the secret keys within the other VPN mechanism, the 
rouge gateway can become a conduit via which assets are 
compromised. 
A significant part of the game engine extensions was 
introduction of PKI features into the game.  Players can choose 
to use a PKI-based key management for their VPN mechanisms 
instead of shared secrets. 
V. PKI SIMULATION 
A. PKI-based VPNs 
If a player chooses to manage VPN keys using a PKI, the 
player must select the root certificates that each PKI 
mechanism will accept.  Scenarios offer players the use of 
“pay-per-cert” public Certification Authorities (CAs). In 
addition to costing the player funds for each certificate, this 
choice can result in spoofing due to bogus certificates issued by 
the public CA.  As an alternative, players can purchase their 
own CA, which is generally less vulnerable to spoofing, (but 
does require the player to hire adequate IT support staff.) 
When players select installed root certificates, they make 
choices about who may make representations about the identity 
of remote VPN mechanisms.  Installing the pay-per-cert root is 
convenient, but players soon discover the CA may not be that 
careful when it comes to signing certificates2.  
Each PKI-based VPN mechanism must also have an 
assigned CA, i.e., the CA that has signed the VPN 
mechanism’s associated certificate.   Two VPN mechanisms 
cannot establish a protected tunnel unless they can validate 
each other’s certificates.  The game allows players to cross 
certify another organization’s certificate such that users can 
communicate with remote business partners via a VPN.  Thus, 
the game simulates the validation of certificate chains.   Use of 
cross certification can lead to the player’s enterprise being 
spoofed by bogus certificates issued by the business partner.  
Within the game, risks introduced by cross certification can be 
mitigated by configuring VPN connection profiles with a 
certificate policy.  Such a policy can restrict communication to 
remote VPN mechanisms whose certificates chains are free of 
cross certified certificates.  Thus, the player may configure a 
VPN gateway to require locally generated certificate chains for 
sensitive intra-enterprise traffic while allowing cross certified 
chains when communicating with a business partner. 
B. PKI Keys within VPN Routes and Attacks 
During attack processing, open VPN tunnels are queried to 
determine the installed roots within the respective VPN 
mechanisms, and to determine the CAs that sign each 
mechanism’s associated certificates.  The attacker motive is 
compared against the assurance of the CA.  Thus, the strength 
of a VPN tunnel is limited by the assurance of the VPN 
platforms as well as the assurance of the mechanisms and 
procedures used when making representations about identity. 
Within the simulation, CAs managed by the enterprise are 
not subject to subversion and spoofing if they are kept off of 
networks and the motive is not extreme.  Networked CAs, 
partner CAs and pay-per-cert CAs have assurance levels 
limited by the assurance of their underlying platforms.  
C. PKI for Email Encryption and Authentication 
Scenario designers create email assets by defining goals 
that require email clients and email transport applications [5].  
Players configure procedural policies to direct the user to use 
some combination of encryption and signing for email sent as 
part of selected user goals.  Similarly, the player directs the 
user to authenticate email received as part of other email goals.  
Scenario designers can contrive scenarios that force players to 
make decisions other than use brute force and “turn everything 
on,”  In one scenario, a remote business partner will not accept 
encrypted email because they don’t want to interfere with the 
“deep packet inspection” performed by their intrusion detection 
system.   
The game simulates the use of PKI to perform key 
management within the game’s email clients.  Players select 
installed roots and certification authorities in a manner similar 
to the configuration of VPN mechanisms.  Purposely crafted 
scenarios lead the player to understand that if secrecy is not 
required, it may be best to sign and not encrypt an email.  For 
                                                           
2 One game CA offers a guarantee that before they issue a certificate, they 
collect their fee. 
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example, since signing an email does not require the signer’s 
email client to validate a certificate, the signer does not require 
3rd party roots or cross certification.  Additionally, players can 
elect to configure the client to use smart card readers in place 
of keys managed by the email client application.   Within the 
game, suitably motivated attacks will compromise the private 
keys managed by the email client on the workstations, while 
smart cards do not present such risks, reflecting the fact that 
private keys never leave the smart card. 
In addition to protecting communications over networks, 
email encryption and signing provides protection of data at rest 
on the email servers.  The potential value of this is illustrated in 
an email scenario in which the player must operate under a 
management mandate to outsource the email server to a 
contractor who is criminally motivated to view the asset.  In 
that scenario, failure to direct virtual users to encrypt their 
email leads to disclosure of the assets.  In that same scenario, a 
virtual user is compelled to access email from a workstation 
controlled by the malicious contractor.  Failure to deploy smart 
cards and smart card readers results in the contractor obtaining 
the user’s secret key and disclosing all of the user’s encrypted 
email on the server. The next section will describe 
vulnerabilities associated with email on the workstations. 
D. Email Attacks and Network Routes 
Within the simulation, the cryptographic algorithms utilized 
to encrypt and sign email are assumed to be quite strong.  
Attacks are focused on the management of keys, and the 
moments in which email is unencrypted (i.e., while being 
composed or viewed).   
As was described above for PKI-based VPN mechanisms, 
the network routes keep track of CAs whose roots are used 
when validating certificates and CAs that sign certificates.  The 
associated assurance is compared with the attacker motives to 
compromise the emails.  As noted earlier, the use of client-
managed keys for email signing and decryption introduces a 
potential for the compromise of the private key.  The game 
engine simulates this vulnerability this by creating a temporary 
asset to represent the key.  The attacker motive to compromise 
the key is derived from the motive to compromise the email 
assets.  The attack engine then attempts to compromise the key.  
If smart cards are used, no key asset is created.  However the 
smart cards themselves might become a conduit for the 
compromise of assets.  If the same smart card is used to access 
email on two different networks (e.g., one sensitive and the 
other unclassified), the attack engine views the smart card as a 
network link between the two respective workstations.  
Malicious software on the workstations would then transfer the 
content of the asset from the sensitive network to the 
unclassified network. 
Within the simulation, an asset generally exists on one 
component.  Other than tracking network segments traversed to 
achieve a virtual user’s goal, the simulation does not involve 
the movement or copying of assets between components.  
When processing attacks on email assets, the game engine 
creates temporary copies of the asset on the sender’s 
workstation and on the receiver’s workstation.  These copies 
are in plain text and are unsigned, regardless of the protection 
granted asset on the email server.  The attack engine is then 
aimed at these temporary assets.  Thus, if the email is 
composed on a workstation containing a Trojan horse, a 
suitably motivated attacker might get a copy of the email 
(assuming the attacker has a network connection to the 
workstation.) 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The addition of PKI features to CyberCIEGE gives players 
an opportunity to explore the abstract functions of different 
kinds PKI components.  Players learn the role of PKI within 
network computer security architectures and how different 
applications make use of PKI to support the management of the 
identity of sources and destinations of data.  Players also learn 
about potential risks associated with the use of PKI by 
experimenting and observing cause and effects.   
The game engine simulation of Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) 
connections is currently being re-implemented to include the 
new PKI functions.  This includes the management of server-
side certificates as well as optional deployment of client side 
certificates (including the use of smart cards).  As is the case 
with use of PKI for VPNs and email, players must configure 
installed roots and certificates to permit users to achieve goals.  
Players can direct users to require “the little padlock” in their 
browser when achieving selected goals.  As is the case with all 
CyberCIEGE procedural policy suggestions, the virtual users 
are more likely to abide by the policy if suitably trained.  
Companion scenarios will illustrate issues related to self-signed 
certificates, as well as risks of relying on SSL to protect high 
value assets. 
REFERENCES 
[1] C.E. Irvine, M.F. Thompson, and K. Allen, "CyberCIEGE: gaming for 
information assurance", Security & Privacy Magazine, IEEE, May-June 
2005, Volume: 3, Issue: 3, page(s): 61- 64, ISSN: 1540-7993 
[2] A. Rollings and E. Adams, Fundamentals of Game Design. Prentice 
Hall, 2006. 
[3] B.D. Cone, C.E. Irvine, M.F. Thompson,  and T.D. Nguyen, “A video 
game for cyber security training and awareness”,  Computers & Security 
26 (2007) pp. 63-72 
[4] C.E. Irvine, and M.F. Thompson,  "Expressing an information security 
policy within a security simulation game", Proceedings of the Sixth 
Workshop on Education in Computer Security (WECS6), Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California , July 12-16 2004, pp. 43-49 
[5] Naval Postgraduate School, The Center for Information Systems 
Security Studies and Research, “CyberCIEGE Scenario Development 
Tool User’s Guide”, , http://cisr.nps.edu/cyberciege/downloads/sdt.pdf. 
Last accessed 17 April 2010. 
[6] Naval Postgraduate School, Identity Management Education Program, 
http://imep.nps.edu/ . Last accessed: 17 April 2010. 
[7] S. Kent, and R. Atkinson, "Security architecture for the internet 
protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998. 
[8] "Trusted Platform Module (TPM) Specifications". Trusted Computing 
Group.  
 
1763
